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FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT-YCA
TREATMENT NOT REQUIRED DURING
UNEXPIRED TERM OF YCA INMATE
SENTENCED TO CONSECUTIVE
ADULT TERM
Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ralston v. Robinson,' the Supreme Court considered whether the
Federal Youth Corrections Act2 ("YCA" or "Act") requires YCA treat-
ment during the unexpired term of a YCA inmate sentenced to a con-
secutive3 adult term. In Robinson, the trial judge who imposed the
consecutive adult sentence for a subsequent crime had determined that
further YCA treatment would not benefit the offender. The Court held
that under these circumstances the Act does not require continued YCA
treatment during the remainder of the inmate's YCA sentence. 4 While
the Robinson majority reached its result by interpreting the history and
structure of the Act, the dissent properly characterized the holding as "a
judicial rewriting of what 'has been accurately described as the most
comprehensive federal statute concerned with sentencing.' "5 In addi-
tion to usurping Congress's role, the majority's opinion ignores explicit
statutory alternatives, poses constitutional double jeopardy problems,
and threatens a trial judge's discretion to impose a YCA sentence. Ral-
ston v. Robinson thus reflects the Court's ambivalence toward the possibil-
ity of rehabilitation under the Youth Corrections Act.
Congress enacted the YCA in 1950 to provide a system for the reha-
bilitation and treatment of offenders under the age of twenty-two con-
victed in federal courts. 6 The Act expanded a trial judge's traditional
1 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
3 For an explanation of the distinction between a consecutive sentence and a concurrent
sentence, see infra note 73 and accompanying text.
4 102 S. Ct. at 243. The Court also held that the power to so modify the YCA sentence
reposes exclusively in the judge, and not in the Bureau of Prisons. Id. at 240. Justice Powell
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but disagreeing with the majority's imposition of
limitations on the Bureau's discretion. Id. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 248 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424,
432 (1974)).
6 As the Court in Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974), explained: "The Act
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sentencing discretion by authorizing sentences tailored to the rehabilita-
tive needs of the youth offender.7 Under the YCA a court may:
(1) place a young defendant on probation,8 (2) sentence the youth to a
rehabilitative sentence of an indeterminate length not to exceed six
years, 9 or sentence the youth to a rehabilitative term in excess of six
is in substantial part an outgrowth of recommendations made by the Judicial Conference of
the United States more than 30 years ago. The principles and procedures contained in the
Conference recommendations were in turn largely based on those developed since 1894 for a
system of treatment of young offenders in England, known as the Borstal system." Id. at 432
(footnote omitted). The legislative history of the YCA described in detail England's experi-
ence with the system:
The natural inquiry is, will the plan work? That it will has been demonstrated by the
experience under the English Borstal system to which it is in many respects similar.
A report of a department committee on prisons appointed by the Home Secretary in
1894 to inquire into the administration of the English prisons found, among other things,
that an extremely large number of youths between the ages of 16 and 21 passed through
the prisons every year; that under the existing system numbers of these young prisoners
came out of prison in a condition as bad or worse than when they went in; and that the
age when the majority of habitual criminals are made lies between 16 and 21.
As a result, an experiment was begun in a wing of Bedford Prison. Younger lads
were segregated from the men and a special program of trade instruction, drill, and a
scheme of rewards and encouragements to industry and good conduct was introduced. A
wing of the prison at Borstal was next set aside for the special handling of offenders
between 16 and 23.
By the end of 1902, the entire institution at Borstal was devoted to an intensive
program, for this age group, of hard work and strict discipline, tempered by contrivances
of reward, encouragement, and hope. From this experimental beginning has developed
what is known as the Borstal system. It now embraces 13 institutions. Some are walled.
Others are completely open. Each institution has its own particular specialty ....
While the institutions differ in many respects, they have certain things in common.
These are, first, a full 16-hour day of arduous active work and recreation, leaving no time
for brooding or self-pity.
Second, an individual plan based on close acquaintance with individual needs and
antecedents and calculated to return the young men to society as social and rehabilitated
citizens.
Third, a high degree of personal interest on the part of the staff, particularly the
housemaster, whose chief job is individual guidance.
The Borstal method of rehabilitation relies on the physical, physiological, and social
characteristics of youth which distinguish them from both children and adults. It is
predicated on the concept that criminal youth require special treatment because of the
number and kind of offenses they commit, the causation factors underlying their con-
duct, and the prospect they hold out for success through correctional treatment.
Three cardinal principles dominate the system: (1) flexibility, (2) individualization,
and (3) emphasis on the intangibles.
H.R. REP. No. 2979,8 Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprintedin 1950 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEvs
3983, 3987 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 2979].
7 Under 13 U.S.C. § 5006 (1976), "youth offender" means a person under the age of
twenty-two years at the time of conviction. A judge may also impose a YCA sentence on a
defendant who is over twenty-two and not yet twenty-six years of age when convicted if the
sentencing court affirmatively "finds that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant will benefit from the treatment provided under the Federal Youth Corrections
Act." 18 U.S.C. § 4216 (1976).
8 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976) provides: "If the court is of the opinion that the youth
offender does not need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the youth offender on probation."
9 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976) provides:
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years but not to exceed the maximum otherwise provided by law.' 0 A
court still retains the power to sentence the youth under regular adult
provisions if it finds the youth will derive no benefit from a YCA
sentence. I I
If the court shall find that a convicted person is a youth offender, and the offense is
punishable by imprisonment under applicable provisions of law other than this subsec-
tion, the court may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by law,
sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment and
supervision pursuant to this chapter until discharged by the Commission as provided in
section 501 7 (c) of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 5017(c)(1976) provides: "A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of
this chapter shall be released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of
four years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally on or
before six years from the date of his conviction." Under § 5010(b), a district court may im-
pose a longer YCA sentence than would be authorized if the offender were sentenced as an
adult. Abernathy v. United States, 418 F.2d 288, 290 (5th Cir. 1969); Johnson v. United
States, 374 F.2d 966, 967 (4th Cir. 1967). As Justice Stevens noted in Robinson:
The federal courts unanimously have upheld § 5010(b) against constitutional equal
protection challenges on the reasoning early expressed by the CHIEF JUSTICE and
often quoted thereafter: "IT]he basic theory of the Act is rehabilitation and in a sense
this rehabilitation may be regarded as the quidpro quo for a longer confinement but under
different conditions and terms than a defendant would undergo in an ordinary prison
102 S. Ct. at 250 (quoting Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Commentators have challenged the quidpro quo justification on the grounds that such
rehabilitation is not being provided. Shepherd, Challenging the RehabilitativeJustiicationfor Inde-
terminate Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System.- The Right to Punishment, 21 ST. Louis U.LJ. 12
(1977); Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in Need of Legislative Reappraisal, II
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 257-60 (1972); Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act.- Flaws in Equal
Protection Analysis, 19 J. FAM. L. 295 (1981).
10 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c) (1976) provides:
If the court shall find that the youth offender may not be able to derive maximum
benefit from treatment by the Commission prior to the expiration of six years from the
date of conviction it may, in lieu of the penalty of imprisonment otherwise provided by
law, sentence the youth offender to the custody of the Attorney General for treatment
and supervision pursuant to this chapter for any further period that may be authorized
by law for the offense or offenses of which he stands convicted or until discharge by the
Commission as provided in section 5017(d) of this chapter.
Section 5017(d)(1976) provides:
A youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this chapter shall be released
conditionally under supervision not later than two years before the expiration of the
term imposed by the court. He may be discharged unconditionally at the expiration of
not less than one year from the date of his conditional release. He shall be discharged
unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed, com-
puted uninteruptedly from the date of conviction.
11 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d)(1976) provides: "If the court shall find that the youth offender will
not derive benefit from treatment under subsection (b) or (c), then the court may sentence the
youth offender under any other applicable penalty provisions." In order to invoke § 5010(d),
the court must state affirmatively that the youth will not derive any benefit, although it need
not provide any explanation for its "no benefit" finding. Dorszynski v. United States, 418
U.S. 424 (1974). 18 U.S.C. § 5010(e) (1976) provides:
If the court desires additional information as to whether a youth offender will derive
benefit from treatment under subsections (b) or (c) it may order that he be committed to
the custody of the Attorney General for observation and study at an appropriate classifi-
cation center or agency. Within sixty days from the date of the order, or such additional
period as the court may grant, the Commission shall report to the court its findings.
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Offenders confined under the YCA are to be segregated from non-
YCA offenders, segregated among themselves according to treatment
needs, and afforded a variety of treatment options.1 2 While courts disa-
gree as to how strictly the Bureau of Prisons must comply with the
YCA's segregation provisions,' 3 the legislative history clearly indicates
that Congress intended that YCA inmates be segregated to prevent
them from being adversely influenced by more hardened criminals.'
4
II. FACTS IN RALSTON V. ROBINSON
In 1974, John C. Robinson, then seventeen years old, entered a
guilty plea to charges of second degree murder in the superior court of
the District of Columbia. The trial judge sentenced Robinson under
§ 5010(c) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act to a ten-year term, rec-
ommending his release only upon the attainment of an eighth grade
12 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976) provides:
Committed youth offenders not conditionally released shall undergo treatment in
institutions of maximum security, medium security, or minimum security types, includ-
ing training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other camps, and other agencies that
will provide the essential varieties of treatment. The Director shall from time to time
designate, set aside, and adapt institutions and agencies under the control of the Depart-
ment ofJustice for treatment. Insofar as practical, such institutions shall be used only for
treatment of committed youth offenders, and such youth offenders shall be segregated
from other offenders, and classes of committed youth offenders shall be segregated ac-
cording to their needs for treatment.
13 For example, the court in Outing v. Bell, 632 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1001 (1981), held, inter alia, that the YCA simply provides for segregation of YCA
offenders from non-YCA offenders "insofar as practical." Id. at 1146; accord Brown v. Carl-
son, 431 F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Wis. 1977) (phrase "insofar as practical" modified both require-
ment of separate facilities and requirement of segregation of YCA inmates from general
prison population). In contrast, the court in United States ex rel. Dancy v. Arnold, 572 F.2d
107 (3d Cir. 1978), held that the modifying phrase applied only to the maintenance of sepa-
rate institutions and did not affect the segregation mandated by the YCA. Id. at 113; accord
Watts v. Hadden, 469 F. Supp. 223, 235 (D. Colo. 1979)(stating that Bureau of Prisons uses
"insofar as practical" phrase as pretext for refusing to segregate inmates). The narrower in-
terpretation set forth in Dancy and Watts better reflects Congress's intent in passing the YCA.
The House Report describing the Act's provisions stated: "Such institutions and agencies are
to be used only for the treatment of youth offenders, so far as practicable; and youth offenders
are to be segregated from other offenders, and the classes of offenders are to be segregated
according to their needs for treatment." H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 6, at 3-4.
The Supreme Court in Ralston v. Robinson, while noting the disagreement among courts,
declined to address that issue. 102 S. Ct. at 241 n.5.
14 The House Report described the need for segregation:
By herding youth with maturity, the novice with the sophisticate, the impressiona-
ble with the hardened, and by subjecting youth offenders to the evil influences of older
criminals and their teaching of criminal techniques, without the inhibitions that come
from normal contacts and counteracting prophylaxis, many of our penal institutions ac-
tively spread the infection of crime and foster, rather than check it.
H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 6, at 2-3. For a discussion of the Act's legislative design, see
Note, Sentencing Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Need for an Explicit Fnding and a
Statement of Reasons, 53 B.U.L. REv. 1071, 1077-79 (1973).
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level of education and the successful completion of vocational training. ' 5
In 1975, during his incarceration at the Federal Correctional Insti-
tute in Ashland, Kentucky, Robinson was found guilty of assaulting a
federal officer.' 6 The United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Kentucky determined that Robinson would not benefit from a
YCA sentence and imposed an additional ten-year adult sentence. After
receiving a pre-sentence report and recommendation from the Bureau of
Prisons, however, the judge reduced the ten-year adult sentence to five
and a half years to be served consecutively to the original YCA sen-
tence. 17 The judge also recommended that Robinson be transferred to a
facility providing greater security.' 8
In 1977, Robinson pleaded guilty to yet another charge of assault-
ing a federal officer. The third trial judge19 sentenced Robinson to an
adult term20 of one year and one day, to run consecutively with his other
sentences.
21
After the imposition of the second adult sentence, the Bureau of
Prisons classified Robinson as an adult offender, 22 denying him any fur-
ther YCA segregation or treatment. 23 Arguing that he was serving a
YCA sentence and thus entitled to segregation, Robinson filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Indiana on May 25, 1978. The United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois, which obtained jurisdiction when
Robinson was transferred to the federal penitentiary at Marion, Illinois,
15 Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077, 1078 (7th Cir. 1981).
16 Robinson violated 18 U.S.C. §§ t11, 1114. Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233, 237
(1981).
17 Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d at 1078.
18 102 S. Ct. at 237.
19 The United States District Court for the Central District of California tried the case
because the assault occurred at the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) at Lompoc, Cali-
fornia. Robinson had been placed in the FCI at Oxford, Wisconsin, after his second convic-
tion, but, due to disciplinary problems, was transferred to the Lompoc facility. Id.
20 The third judge failed to expressly find that Robinson would derive no benefit from a
YCA term. The judge was obligated to make such a finding under Dorszynski v. United
States, 418 U.S. 424 (1974) (trial court must make "no benefit" finding before sentencing
youth under 22 to adult sentence). The Supreme Court did not discuss the judge's failure
since it focused on the second judge's findings. 102 S. Ct. at 244.
21 102 S. Ct. at 237.
22 The Bureau of Prisons acted pursuant to its internal policy. The Bureau narrowly
defines a "YCA Inmate" as "any inmate sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), (c), or (e) who
is not also sentenced to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, whether state or federal."
Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement No. 5215.2 at I (Dec. 12, 1978), quoted in Ralston v.
Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233, 237 (1981).
23 Robinson allegedly never received YCA treatment or segregation, even when he was
classified as a YCA inmate. Respondent's Brief at 2. The Supreme Court took note but
declined to address the issue since it held that Robinson was not entitled to such treatment or
segregation. 102 S_ Ct. at 237 n.2.
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granted the writ.2 4
The seventh circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of the writ,
holding that the YCA forbids the reevaluation of a YCA sentence by a
second judge, even if the second-judge makes an explicit finding that the
offender would derive no benefit from further treatment under the
YCA.2 5 It moreover rejected the Government's argument that the YCA
gives the Bureau of Prisons the discretion to decide whether a prisoner
serving a YCA sentence but facing a consecutive adult sentence should
continue to be treated as a YCA offender.
2 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2 7 to decide whether a youth
offender who is sentenced to a consecutive adult term of imprisonment
while serving a YCA sentence must receive YCA treatment and segrega-
tion for the remainder of the youth sentence.
2 8
III. OPINIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Court, per Justice Marshall,29 held that the YCA does not re-
quire YCA treatment for an offender who is sentenced to a consecutive
adult term of imprisonment while serving a YCA sentence if the judge
who imposes the adult sentence finds that the offender will derive no
benefit from such treatmentA The Court also stated that the YCA does
not authorize the Bureau of Prisons to make the determination of
whether the offender will derive benefit from the YCA; the power rests
24 Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077, 1078-79 (1981). On January 7, 1980, the district
court ordered the government to transfer adult offenders and to afford YCA treatment. Id. at
1079. The court, however, also granted the government's motion to stay the order pending
appeal. Thus, on June 17, 1980, Robinson was transferred to the FCI at Memphis, Tennes-
see. This FCI has a YCA unit but Robinson was housed with the general adult population
and did not receive YCA treatment. Id. The Government appealed from the order granting
Robinson's writ of habeas corpus, and Robinson appealed from the stay of that order. Id.
25 Id. at 1081-82.
26 Id. at 1083.
27 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981).
28 The Court noted that the circuit courts were divided over the issue. 102 S. Ct. at 236
n.1. The seventh circuit had held that a YCA inmate who is sentenced to a consecutive adult
prison term must receive YCA treatment and segregation for the remainder of the YCA sen-
tence. Robinson v. Ralston, 642 F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1981). In Robinson, Judge Swygert
agreed with the eighth circuit's rationale in Mustain v. Pearson, 592 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1979)
(YCA offender retained YCA status until the consecutive adult sentence began). The third
and fourth circuits, however, had decided the same issue prior to the seventh circuit's ruling
in Robinson, and both reached the opposite conclusion from that of the seventh circuit. Out-
ing v. Bell, 632 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981); Thompson v.
Carlson, 624 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1980). Judge Swygert, for the seventh circuit, drew upon the
dissent in Thompson to support his holding in Robinson. 642 F.2d at 1082.
29 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and White joined Justice Mar-
shall's opinion. Justice Powell concurred in the result and filed a separate opinion.
30 102 S. Ct. at 243.
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solely with the sentencing judge.31
Justice Marshall noted that "[n]o provision of the YCA explicitly
governs the issue" 32 of whether a judge sentencing a YCA inmate to an
adult sentence may make a "no benefit" finding with respect to the re-
mainder of the YCA term. Thus Justice Marshall relied upon the struc-
ture and legislative history of the YCA to find that a second judge may
reevaluate the YCA sentence imposed by the first judge.
33
Justice Marshall concluded that courts could adjust a YCA sen-
tence when necessary because Congress intended to provide rehabilita-
tive treatment tailored to the needs of each offender. Otherwise, "[t]he
result would be an inflexible rule requiring, in many cases, the continua-
tion of futile YCA treatment. '34 Indeed, Justice Marshall pointed out
that since Congress had anticipated that efforts at rehabilitation might
prove futile,:5 Congress probably assumed that unsuccessful efforts
would not be continued.
Justice Marshall rejected Robinson's argument that § 5011 of the
Act-which provides that "[c]ommitted youth offenders . . .shall un-
dergo treatment. . . and such youth offenders shall be segregated from
other offenders" 3 6 --prevents modification of the essential treatment and
segregation requirements of a YCA sentence. He interpreted the lan-
guage as requiring simply that the Bureau of Prisons carry out a court's
mandate with respect to segregation and treatment, but not "as requir-
ing the judge to make an irrevocable determination of segregation or
treatment needs, or as precluding a subsequent judge from redeter-
mining these needs in light of intervening events."
'37
31 Id. at 241. Thus, the Court said that the Bureau of Prisons Policy Statement, which
narrowly defined "YCA Inmate" to exclude those who were originally sentenced under the
YCA but who were also sentenced to a concurrent or consecutive adult term, was a "much
too broad" assertion of power. Id.
32 102 S. Ct. at 241.
33 The history and structure of the YCA . ..demonstrate Congress's intent that a
court-but not prison officials-may require a youth offender to serve the remainder of a
YCA sentence as an adult after the offender has received a consecutive adult term. First,
the YCA prescribes certain basic elements of treatment, segregation from adults and
individualized rehabilitative programs, as part of a YCA sentence. Second, sponsors of
the Act repeatedly stated that its purpose was to prevent youths from becoming recidi-
vists, and to insulate them from the insidious influence of more experienced adult
criminals. Housing incorrigible youths with youths who show promise of rehabilitation
would not serve this purpose. Third, the decision whether to employ the unique treat-
ment methods of the YCA is exclusively committed to the discretion of the sentencing
judge, rather than to prison officials.
Id. at 242.
34 Id.
35 "Congress did understand that the original treatment imposed by the sentencing judge
might fail, and that protective as well as rehabilitative purposes might justify a lengthy con-
finement under § 5010(c)." Id. at 241 (referring to the House Report on the proposed Act).
36 18 O.S.C. § 5011.
37 102 S. Ct. at 240 (emphasis in original).
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Justice Marshall drew upon other provisions of the YCA to bolster
his conclusions:
[I]n several circumstances, the YCA permits a youth offender initially sen-
tenced under the YCA to be treated as an adult for what would otherwise
be the remainder of the YCA sentence. For example, the statute permits a
court to sentence a defendant to an adult term if he commits an adult
offense after receiving a suspended sentence and probation under
§ 5010(a).3
8
Thus, Justice Marshall reasoned, "[i]t hardly seems logical to prohibit
an immediate modification of respondent's treatment conditions simply
because he originally received the harsher sentence of YCA
incarceration.
'39
While the issue in Robinson focused upon the consequences of a con-
secutive adult sentence, the Court recognized that a concurrent adult sen-
tence immediately modifies the original YCA sentence. Justice
Marshall declared that "it would be anomalous . . .not to permit a
consecutive term to have that effect." '40 As a practical matter, Robin-
son's second trial judge could have obtained the same result-immedi-
ate alteration of the YCA term to an adult term-had the court
sentenced Robinson to a concurrent adult term of an appropriately
longer length to compensate for the overlap.4'
Finally, Justice Marshall concluded that even though the Bureau of
Prisons lacked the independent authority to change Robinson's status
from a "YCA Inmate" to an adult inmate, the modification could be
justified by the second trial judge's finding that Robinson would not
benefit from further YCA treatment.42 Justice Marshall concluded that
the second trial judge's finding applied to the remainder of the YCA
term as well as to the sentence imposed for the second crime. "In the
future, we expect that judges will eliminate interpretative difficulties by
making an explicit 'no benefit' finding with respect to the remainder of
the YCA sentence." 4
3
Justice Powell concurred with the majority's holding that the Act
does not require YCA treatment for a YCA offender who is sentenced to
a consecutive adult term. 44 He filed a separate opinion, however, to
38 Id. at 242 (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall also pointed out that the YCA contem-
plates reevaluation of an initial sentence for purposes ofareducing the sentence. Id. at 242 n.7.
39 Id. at 243.
40 Id. at 243 n.9.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 244.
43 Id. In Ralston, Justice Marshall bridged the "interpretative difficulties" by drawing an
inference from the second judge's "no benefit" finding. In the future, however, a subsequent
judge must make an explicit "no benefit" finding with respect to the remainder of the defend-
ant's YCA sentence.
44 Id. at 245 (Powell, J., concurring).
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disagree with the majority's limitations on the Bureau of Prisons' au-
thority under the YCA. According to Justice Powell, the YCA expressly
gives the Director of the Bureau of Prisons the power to treat a YCA
offender as an adult:
The Director, inter alia, may "order the committed youth offender confined
and afforded treatment under such conditions as he believes best designed for the
protection of the public." Id. at § 5015(a) (3) (emphasis added). "The Di-
rector may transfer at any time a committed youth offender from one
agency or institution to any other agency or institution." Id. at § 5015(b)
(emphasis added) ...
Thus, the express language of YCA vests broad discretion in the
Director.
45
Thus, because the "statutory emphasis. . . is on flexibility and individ-
ualized treatment, ' 46 Justice Powell concluded that the Director, as well
as a federal judge, possesses authority to discontinue YCA treatment.
Indeed, Justice Powell argued that the Director possesses greater discre-
tion than a court because the Director may act at any time, not simply
when the YCA inmate stands convicted of a subsequent crime.
4 7
Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Brennan and O'Connor joined,
filed a dissent. At the outset he noted that an adult sentence is more
severe than a YCA sentence. Justice Stevens argued that changing a
YCA sentence to an adult sentence of equal length constitutes an in-
crease in severity which probably violates the double jeopardy clause of
the fifth amendment. Even if it does not violate the Constitution, he
argued, the increase in severity is invalid as contrary to congressional
intent and the common law:
Whether the well-settled rule prohibiting judges from increasing the sever-
ity of a sentence after it has become final is constitutionally mandated, it is
unquestionably the sort of rule that judges may not disregard without ex-
press authorization from Congress.
That rule requires a firm rejection of the argument that a second sen-
tencing judge has power to convert an unexpired YCA sentence into an
adult sentence.
48
Justice Stevens first assumed arguendo that Congress did not in-
tend to have incorrigible youths housed with corrigible ones. According
to Justice Stevens, this observation does not lead to the conclusion that a
second judge imposing a consecutive adult sentence could confine a
45 Id. at 246.
46 Id.
47 We properly defer to the Director's judgment that continued segregation from adult
offenders is no longer "practical" under such circumstances. Even in the absence of sub-
sequent felony convictions, there could be occasions when, because of a youth offender's
incorrigibility and threat to the safety of others, it would be highly impractical to continue
his segregation in a youth center.
Id. (emphasis in original).
48 Id. at 246-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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YCA inmate under an adult sentence for the remainder of the
unexpired YCA term. A less drastic approach could address Congress's
intentions equally as well: the second judge could simply impose a con-
current adult sentence and thereby end the offender's YCA treatment.
49
Justice Stevens reasoned that since this alternative is available to a sen-
tencing judge, Congress's intent does not mandate the result reached by
the majority.50
Next, Justice Stevens attacked the majority's argument that since
the YCA expressly permits, in some circumstances, modification of YCA
probation to an adult sentence, the Act implicitly permits modification
under the circumstances in Robinson:
I do not disagree with the Court that the imposition of a YCA sentence
does not entitle an offender to YCA treatment for the full length of that
sentence no matter what crimes he commits in the interim, or that [Robin-
son] could have been subjected to immediate adult confinement in each of
the Court's examples. I do not agree, however, that a second judge may
impose adult treatment on an offender who continues to be incarcerated
not on the basis of a subsequent adult sentence but on the basis of the
original YCA sentence. None of the Court's examples poses that situation
51
In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out, since the YCA expressly permits a
judge to reduce a sentence in light of changed circumstances, but does not
expressly permit a judge to increase it, Congress did not intend modifi-
cations which increase a sentence's severity.52 He concluded that:
"[T]he Court is bound to follow the common-law rule absent affirmative
evidence that Congress intended to depart from that rule."
53
Finally, Justice Stevens suggested that "[n]ot only did Congress not
intend the result reached by the Court. . .[but] there is good reason to
believe that Congress intended just the opposite."54 In enacting the
YCA, Justice Stevens explained, Congress recognized that a YCA sen-
tence, to effectuate rehabilitation, would often be of a longer duration
than would be authorized or imposed if the offender were sentenced as
an adult.55 He quoted the Chief Justice's reasoning in a circuit court
decision: "[T]he basic theory of the Act is rehabilitation and in a sense
this rehabilitation may be regarded as comprising the quidpro quo for a
49 Id. at 248.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 249.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 250 n. 11 (emphasis in original). "At common law a sentence could be amended
during the term in which it was imposed subject to the limitation that 'a punishment already
parlP su~fered be not increased.' "Id. at 246 n.l (quoting F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMI-
NAL PLEADING § 913, at 641 (9th ed. 1889)) (emphasis added by Justice Stevens).
54 Id. at 249-50.
55 Id. at 250.
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longer confinement but under different conditions and terms than a de-
fendant would undergo in an ordinary prison."' 56 Hence, under this quid
pro quo theory, the Court's holding is counter to Congress's intent that a
youth offender's term be long enough to permit rehabilitation.57 The
modification from a YCA term to an adult term also yields unfair results
to a defendant who, according to Justice Stevens, would not have served
as lengthy a sentence had the defendant originally received an adult
sentence.58 Justice Stevens also raised the possibility that, knowing a
YCA term could be modified to an adult sentence, the defendant would
have elected to stand trial instead of entering a guilty plea. 59
Justice Stevens concluded by arguing that it was up to Congress,
and not the Court, to enlarge upon the YCA to deal with unforeseen
problems. 60 He considered irrelevant the issue of whether YCA treat-
ment would in fact benefit Robinson since "Congress, by the statute
applicable in this case, has mandated the continuance [of YCA treat-
ment]. ' '61 In Justice Stevens' view, the only issue was "whether a federal
judge . . .sentencing an inmate for an offense committed while . . .
serving a sentence for an earlier crime may not only impose the punish-
ment authorized by law for the later offense but may also take it upon
himself to enhance the earlier sentence as well."
'62
IV. DISCUSSION
The majority in Ralston v. Robinson, by relying upon the "history
and structure" 63 of the Youth Corrections Act to reach its holding, ex-
tended its focus unnecessarily beyond explicit options available under
the Act. The Robinson Court held that a second trial judge who imposes
a consecutive adult sentence upon a YCA inmate may immediately alter
the inmate's status to that of an adult offender for the remainder of the
YCA term;64 the Court could have achieved the same result by requir-
ing a trial judge to impose a concurrent adult sentence if he or she finds
that the inmate will derive no further benefit from the YCA term.65
56 Id. (quoting Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 283, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1962)).
57 Id. at 250-51.
58 Id. at 251.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 252.
61 Id. at 252 n.22 (quoting Judge Pell's concurring opinion in Robinson v. Ralston, 642
F.2d at 1083).
62 102 S. Ct. at 252.
63 102 S. Ct. at 242.
64 The trial court would have to make an explicit finding that the defendant would derive
"no benefit" from any further YCA treatment. Id. at 244.
65 The trial court could impose a longer concurrent adult sentence than consecutive adult
sentence to result in the same ultimate prison sentence. Id. at 243 n.9. See infira notes 71-76
and accompanying text.
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Indeed, the majority could have addressed its underlying concern that
incorrigible YCA offenders be segregated from corrigible ones'31i by sim-
ply requiring enforcement of YCA provisions concerning segregation of
YCA inmates from one another6 7 instead of by allowing the transforma-
tion of an inmate's YCA status to that of an adult offender.
6 8
By ignoring the explicit statutory alternatives provided by Con-
gress, the Robinson Court reached an incorrect result. It has also created
two more significant problems. First, the transformation of a YCA sen-
tence into an adult sentence by a subsequent judge constitutes an in-
crease in the sentence's severity which, without explicit congressional
support, creates double jeopardy problems. 9 Second, a subsequent
judge's reevaluation of a YCA sentence impinges upon the original sen-
tencing judge's discretion. The original judge's discretion is supposedly
nonreviewable under the YCA's rehabilitative design.7 0  Both these
problems, as well as the availability of statutory alternatives, support the
dissent's view in Robinson.
A. EXPLICIT STATUTORY ALTERNATIVES
L Concurrent adult sentence
Both Justice Marshall's majority opinion 7t and Justice Stevens's
dissent 72 recognized that a concurrent adult sentence would without
question immediately change a defendant's status from "YCA inmate"
into "adult inmate." The crucial issue in Robinson was whether a judge
imposing a consecutive adult sentence could effect the same immediate
change by having the inmate serve the remainder of the YCA term as an
adult.
The distinction between a concurrent adult sentence and a consecutive
adult sentence is important. A concurrent adult sentence cuts short a
YCA sentence while a consecutive sentence does not. A concurrent
adult sentence does not alter the terms of a YCA sentence; it merely
means that an inmate will immediately begin to serve an adult term for
66 The majority discussed segregation of inmates as a major feature of the Act:
"[S]ponsors of the Act repeatedly stated that its purpose was to prevent youths from becom-
ing recidivists, and to insulate them from the insidious influence of more experienced adult
criminals. Housing incorrigible youths with youths who show promise of rehabilitation
would not serve this purpose." 102 S. Ct. at 242.
67 18 U.S.C. § 5011 provides in part that: "[C]iasses of committed youth offenders shall
be segregated according to their needs for treatment."
68 See infia notes 89.98 and accompanying text.
69 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See infia notes 99-111 and accompanying text.
70 See infia notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
71 102 S. Ct. at 243 & n.9.
72 102 S. Ct. at 248 & nn.7-8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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a different crime. A consecutive sentence provides no overlap and hence
permits a longer total term of imprisonment than a concurrent
sentence.
73
Justice Stevens found no support in the Youth Corrections Act for
allowing a second judge to impose a consecutive adult sentence while
treating an inmate as an adult under the unexpired YCA term. He said:
"A much less drastic solution will accomplish the objectives ascribed to
Congress. The second judge may simply issue a concurrent adult sen-
tence and thereby end the offender's YCA treatment. ' 74 Indeed, Justice
Stevens found that under § 5017 of the Act, prison officials may treat a
consecutive adult sentence as a concurrent one by terminating the YCA
sentence and allowing the inmate to begin serving the "consecutive"
adult sentence. 75 Thus, the language of § 5017 provides an explicit stat-
utory avenue for immediately altering a YCA inmate's status to that of
an adult offender.
76
Justice Marshall ignored this explicit statutory alternative. First,
he argued that the need to segregate corrigible youth from those who
show promise of rehabilitation mandated a court's power to "adjust the
conditions of confinement over time" to discontinue "futile YCA treat-
ment. '77 This need for segregation, however, does not necessarily re-
quire the solution Marshall set forth; § 5017 provides an explicit method
of discontinuing futile YCA treatment. 78
Second, Justice Marshall argued that since some provisions of the
YCA permit reevaluation of "what would otherwise be the remainder of
a YCA sentence," reevaluation of an existing YCA sentence by a subse-
quent judge imposing a consecutive adult sentence was also implicitly
permitted by the Act. 79 For example:
73 For example, if an inmate has eight more years of a YCA sentence to serve at the time
of receiving a concurrent adult sentence of ten years for a subsequent crime, the inmate will
stop serving the YCA sentence and immediately begin the ten-year term. If the same YCA
inmate instead receives a consecutive adult sentence of ten years, the total time to be served
will be eighteen years, rather than ten. Clearly, the inmate will be an adult inmate during
the final ten years. The issue in Robinson was whether the court in this example could have
the inmate classified as an adult for the initial eight years remaining on the YCA sentence.
74 Id. at 248.
75 Id. 18 U.S.C. § 5017(a) provides that the U.S. Parole Commission may "at any lime
after reasonable notice to the Director [of the Bureau of Prisons] release conditionally under
supervision a committed youth offender." Id. (emphasis added). 18 U.S.C. § 5017(d) pro-
vides that "[a] youth offender committed under section 5010(c) of this chapter ... shall be
discharged unconditionally on or before the expiration of the maximum sentence imposed
.... " (emphasis added). Robinson was sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(c). 102 S. Ct. at
236.
76 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77 102 S. Ct. at 242.
78 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
79 102 S. Ct. at 242. Justice Marshall pointed out in a footnote that "a judge may reduce
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If respondent had been sentenced initially to probation under § 5010(a)
and had been subsequently convicted of criminal assault, the court could
have imposed an adult sentence for the original crime, for the assault, or
for both, to begin immediately. In fact, respondent committed his second
crime while incarcerated. It hardly seems logical to prohibit an immediate
modification of respondent's treatment conditions simply because he origi-
nally received the harsher sentence of incarceration. 80
Again, though, Justice Marshall's second argument fails to demonstrate
statutory support for allowing a subsequent judge to alter a YCA term
to an adult term. The examples Justice Marshall presented apply only
to situations where a defendant is at liberty and violates the terms of
probation, or where the judge may reduce the severity of a YCA of-
fender's sentence. They do not apply to the situation in Robinson, where
the judge increased the severity of a prison sentence.81 In the context of
the YCA, "the most comprehensive federal statute concerned with sen-
tencing, '8 2 Justice Stevens persuasively concluded that the "absence of
statutory support is fatal" 83 to Justice Marshall's argument.
Finally, Justice Marshall noted that since a concurrent sentence im-
mediately alters a YCA inmate's status to that of an adult offender, "[it
would be anomalous. . . not to permit a consecutive term to have that
effect, since a concurrent sentence is traditionally imposed as a less se-
vere sanction than a consecutive sentence." '84 Justice Marshall's obser-
vation, however, does not compel the result in Robinson. Since judges
can achieve through a concurrent adult sentence the desired result of
immediately altering a YCA inmate's status to that of an adult offeider,
Justice Marshall need not have circumvented the statute to permit an
alternative method. Justice Marshall's argument that a concurrent sen-
tence is traditionally less severe a sanction than a consecutive one simply
misses the mark85 -the YCA governs in this case, not tradition. Relying
the severity of the terms of commitment in light of changed circumstances. The YCA does
not disturb 'the power of any court to suspend the imposition or execution of any sentence
and place a youth offender on probation.' 18 U.S.C. § 5023." Id. at n.7. Also, under 18
U.S.C. § 5021, the YCA "permits a court to unconditionally discharge a youth on probation
prior to the expiration of the probationary period." Id.
80 Id. at 242-43.
81 Probation under § 5010(a) of the Act is not a "sentence" within the strict meaning of
the word, but an option in lieu of sentencing. Dunn v. United States, 561 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.
1977); United States v. Chappell, 480 F. Supp. 321 (W.D. Okla. 1978). While Congress ex-
pressly provided for revocation of probation and institution of any applicable sentence, it did
not so provide for a YCA prison term already being served.
82 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432 (1974).
83 Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. at 249 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 243 n.9. See also Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d 415, 422 (3d Cir. 1980).
85 In Thompson, for example, the subsequent court sentenced a YCA inmate to a consecu-
tive term of life imprisonment. 624 F.2d at 416. As a practical matter, a concurrent life term
would have been no less severe.
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on tradition instead of on the Act, the majority ignored express congres-
sional commands.
Moreover, the Robinson holding allows more stringent sentences
than were possible before. A consecutive sentence of the maximum stat-
utory length will result in a longer combined sentence than any concur-
rent sentence would for the same crime. Since § 5017 of the YCA
provides for termination of the YCA term under certain circumstances,
it authorizes the concurrent adult sentence, not the consecutive sen-
tence, as the method of changing a YCA inmate's status.8 6 Thus, the
Act itself mandates the method producing the lower ultimate sentence.
8 7
Indeed, the "rule of lenity"-which dictates that penal statues be con-
strued against the sovereign-requires a lenient construction of the
YCA.88 The majority opinion offered no statutory arguments against
this more lenient approach.
2. Segregation under the YCA
The Robinson majority chose not to pursue a second explicit statu-
tory alternative: confining Robinson as a YCA inmate for the remain-
der of his unexpired term. Justice Marshall concluded that continued
treatment as a YCA inmate was inappropriate for Robinson since
"housing incorrigible youths with youths who show promise of rehabili-
tation" would not serve the purposes of the YCA,8 9 and since the second
trial judge had found that Robinson would not benefit from further
YCA treatment. 9°
Justice Marshall discussed the need to segregate "incorrigibles"
from other YCA offenders as if the only avenue open to the courts was
sentencing Robinson as an adult. Yet, under § 5011, the YCA itself pro-
vides for segregation of YCA offendersfrom one another and moreover pro-
vides for housing in maximum security institutions, if necessary:
"Committed youth offenders . . .shall undergo treatment in institu-
86 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
87 Statutory construction in favor of the lesser punishment is consistent with the "rule of
lenity," which requires courts to resolve statutory or sentencing ambiguities in favor of leni-
ency. See, e.g., Thompson v. Carlson, 624 F.2d at 422 n.8 (citing A. CAMPBELL, LAW OF
SENTENCING 249-50 (1978) (where sentencing court is silent as to whether multiple sentences
run consecutively or concurrently, judicially created "rule of lenity" will be employed to the
effect that sentences will be served concurrently)).
88 As Justice Frankfurter explained in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955):
When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared
will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of any senti-
mental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscrib-
ing evil or anti-social conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to
resolve doubts against the imposition of a harsher punishment.
89 102 S. Ct. at 242.
90 Id. at 244.
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tions of maximum securi y, medium security, or minimum security types
. . .and classes of committed offenders shall be segregated according to
their needs for treatment." 9' Hence, under the statute, the Court could
have required Robinson to be housed with other YCA offenders like
himself,92 away from adult offenders and less sophisticated YCA
offenders.
Furthermore, the majority assumed, based on the general rehabili-
tative design of the YCA, that "Congress did not intend that a person
who commits serious crimes while serving a YCA sentence should auto-
matically receive treatment that has proven futile."'93 This assumption,
though, does not necessarily compel the conclusion that Robinson
would derive no benefit from the remainder of his YCA term. At the
time of his first adult conviction, Robinson had served only one year of
his ten-year sentence under the YCA.94 Yet, "[t]he proponents of the
Youth Corrections Act repeatedly emphasized that prison officials must
be given sufficient time to rehabilitate youth offenders . . .,95
Whether or not Robinson's YCA treatment actually proved futile, the
second trial court did not explicitly find that Robinson would not bene-
fit from the remaining YCA sentence,96 and he quite possibly would
have declined to do so had he addressed the issue.
97
The explicit statutory provisions of the YCA concerning treatment
and segregation mandate continued YCA treatment for Robinson. The
YCA contains no provisions outlining the reevaluation of an existing
YCA sentence by a subsequent judge sentencing an inmate for a differ-
ent offense.98 Moreover, Justice Marshall's two proferred reasons for in-
9' 18 U.S.C. § 5011 (1976) (emphasis added).
92 As of December 31, 1980, there were 1,375 inmates serving YCA sentences. Of these,
175. or 12.7%, were also serving concurrent or consecutive adult sentences. Petitioner's Brief
for Certiorari at 7 n.5, Ralston v. Robinson, 102 S. Ct. 233 (1981).
93 102 S. Ct. at 245.
94 Id. at 236-37.
95 Id. at 250. See also id. at 250 n.15.
96 Id. at 244. Justice Marshall noted: "In the future we expect that judges will eliminate
interpretative difficulties by making an explicit 'no benefit' finding with respect to the re-
mainder of the YCA sentence." Id.
97 Robinson v. Ralston, 624 F.2d 1077, 1082 (7th Cir. 1981):
[T]he two judges who subsequently imposed the consecutive adult sentences, presumably
knowing that petitioner was serving a YCA sentence, might have decided to sentence
petitioner as an adult precisely because he was currently a YCA prisoner-believing that
after completion of YCA treatment, further treatment would not be needed; or that if
petitioner had not benefitted from treatment at the conclusion of his YCA sentence, he
would not benefit from a second YCA sentence.
98 Instead, the Act directsprison andprobation o ffers to constantly reevaluate treatment of
YCA inmates:
The Director shall cause periodic examinations and re-examinations to be made of
all committed youth offenders and shall report to the Commission as to each such of-
fender as the Commission may require. United States probation officers and supervisory
1982] 1669
1670 SUPREME COURT REVIEW [Vol. 73
ferring such reevaluation-the need to segregate and the futility of
treating Robinson-fail to justify looking beyond the YCA's language.
B. DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEM
As Justice Stevens argued in his dissent, the Robinson holding is seri-
ously flawed because it permits a subsequent judge to increase the sever-
ity of an existing YCA sentence without express congressional
authorization. 99 The majority opinion, while acknowledging that
changing a YCA sentence to an adult sentence of equal length increases
the sentence's severity, replied that Congress intended this result.100
The majority, however, ignored Congress's express provisions under the
YCA in reaching the Robinson holding; 0 1 hence, its argument that Con-
gress intended the result does not alleviate the problem.
Not only is a given number of years under a YCA sentence qualita-
tively less severe than an adult sentence of the same length, 0 2 but a
YCA sentence is generally longer than that which an adult would re-
ceive for the same crime. 0 3 Rehabilitation is the quidpro quo for the
longer YCA sentence; a YCA sentence must allow for sufficient time to
rehabilitate the offender.? 4 Thus, when a YCA sentence is changed to
agents shall likewise report to the Commission respecting youth offenders under their
supervision as the Commission may direct.
18 U.S.C. § 5016 (1976).
99 102 S. Ct. at 246-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at 245 n.14.
101 See supra notes 74-98 and accompanying text.
102 102 S. Ct. at 250; Carter v. United States, 306 F.2d 382, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger,
J., for the court).
103 102 S. Ct. at 250-5 1.
104 Id. At the same time, the YCA gives prison officials the discretion to authorize the early
release of those youths who progress quickly. 18 U.S.C. § 5017 (1976). The long sentence
coupled with the possibility of early release addresses the problem of sentences being too long
or too short for effective rehabilitation. As James V. Bennett, the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, testified:
From the hundreds of cases of this type which have come across my desk I have
formed the conclusion that in the task of correcting the offender the crucial element is
that of time. Attitudes, habits, interests, standards cannot be changed overnight. Train-
ing in work habits and skills requires time. Once the individual has received the maxi-
mum benefit from the institutional program, however, it is just as important that his
release to the community be effected promptly. In the case of each person confined there
comes a period when he has his best prospects of making good in the community. His
release should occur at this time. If he is released earlier he will not be ready for the task
of establishing himself; if later, he may become bitter, unsure of himself, or jittery like the
athlete who is overtrained.
Rarely does a day go by in one of our institutions for younger offenders without a
youth being received whose sentence is either far too long or far too short, if the institu-
tion is to carry out its objective of correctional treatment.
I have seen thousands of men rightly sent to prison but wrongly for periods so short
that their imprisonment was only an expense to the Government and accomplished little
so far as the rehabilitation of the man or the protection of the community was concerned.
I have seen men sent to prison for so long that all efforts in their behalf were frustrated.
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an adult term of the same length, it is not only qualitatively more severe
but in most cases longer than the adult sentence the offender would
have received had an adult sentence been imposed initially.'
0 5
The double jeopardy clause prohibits subsequent increases in pun-
ishment as well as repeated prosecutions. 0 6 The clause is not violated,
however, if Congress intends subsequent increases in punishment as part
of the legislative design. 0 7 The Robinson majority argued that Congress
intended such modification of punishments in the YCA: "Congress has
provided a court with power to modify a sentence in light of changed
circumstances . . . .Here, the statute permits a judge to modify the
conditions of a YCA sentence if the offender is convicted of a subsequent
adult crime and if further YCA treatment would be futile."' 0 8
The majority's argument, though, is unsupported by the explicit
language of the YCA.' 0 9 While the YCA provides for alteration of pro-
bation if necessary, ' 10 Congress did not adopt language expressly per-
mitting a subsequent judge to change a YCA sentence into an adult
sentence. Because the Court reached an incorrect holding on statutory
grounds, the resultant increase in the severity of Robinson's original sen-
tence violates the double jeopardy clause."'I
C. ENCROACHMENT UPON JUDICIAL DISCRETION
The Robinson holding undermines the initial trial judge's discretion
102 S. Ct. 251 n. 16 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting CorrectionalSystemfor Youth Ofenders: Hear-
ings on S. 1/14 and S 2609 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Committee on theJudiciaqy, 81st Cong.,
Ist Sess., 27 (1949)). The Court also referred to this testimony in Durst v. United States, 434
U.S. 542, 546 n.7 (1978) (Payment of fine as a condition of probation under the YCA upheld)
(8-0 decision).
105 102 S. Ct. at 251.
106 United States v. Best, 571 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1978). The Double Jeopardy Clause pro-
vides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The clause incorporates the common law rule
that a punishment already partly suffered may not be increased. See supra note 53.
107 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333 (1981) (consecutive sentences for same act were
intended by Congress, hence constitutional). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S.
117 (1980) (Congress expressly authorized increase of sentence after initial sentence was set
aside on direct appeal). See generaly Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (guarantee against
double jeopardy is limited to assuring that court does not exceed its legislative authorization).
Congress may permit subsequent sentence increases because it has the power to provide statu-
torily for sanctions as stringent as it deems necessary, subject to the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. The double jeopardy ban applies only against the courts.
108 102 S. Ct. at 244 n.10.
109 See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
11o 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-56, 5010 (1976).
111 Justice Stevens at 102 S. Ct. at 247 n.4 likened Robinson to Roberts v. United States, 320
U.S. 264 (1943), in which the Court held that: "[H]aving exercised its discretion by sentenc-
ing an offender to a definite term of imprisonment in advance of probation, a court may not
later upon revocation or probation set aside that sentence and increase the term of imprison-
ment." Id. at 272-73.
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in imposing a YCA sentence. A second judge may now reevaluate the
first judge's sentence in light of a crime committed subsequent to the
first crime. This encroachment upon a judge's sentencing discretion is
not only undesirable as a matter of policy, but is also contrary to the
design of the Youth Corrections Act.
Only eight years before Robinson, in Dorszynskiv. United States," - the
Court recognized that the YCA was "intended to broaden the scope of
judicial sentencing discretion to include the alternatives of treatment or
probation thereunder."' 13 The Dorszynski Court further recognized that
"well-established doctrine bars review of the exercise of sentencing dis-
cretion .... ,,1 4 Accordingly, the Court found that no appellate re-
view is warranted once a judge exercises sentencing discretion under the
YCA."15
If an appellate judge is not permitted to reevaluate a trial judge's
imposition of a YCA sentence, a second trial judge should not be
permited to do so either. The broad sentencing discretion afforded fed-
eral judges has resulted in striking differences in the types of sentences
they impose in similar cases." 6 The variety of attitudes and experiences
among federal judges concerning the YCA suggests that there would be
striking differences in YCA sentencing as well.'' 7 Almost certainly,
112 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
113 Id. at 437.
"The proposed legislation is designed to make available for the discretionary use of the
Federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of [youth offenders] that will pro-
mote the rehabilitation of those who in the opinion of the sentencing judge show promise of becom-
ing useful citizens . . . ." Id. at 436 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2979, supra note 6, at 4).
114 Id. at 443.
"15 Id.
116 In the name of "individualization," sentencing judges in most jurisdictions have
been given the widest leeway. . . . The most obvious drawback of allowing wide-open
discretion in the name of "individualization" is the disparity it permits. Judges whose
sentencing decisions are unchecked by general standards are free to decide similar cases
differently. A striking illustration emerged in a recent conference of federal trial judges
of the Second Circuit. . . . The facts of numerous cases were selected from the files, and
each of the fifty judges present was asked to state what sentences he would have imposed.
The results, in some instances, were striking discrepancies. In one case, a crime that drew
a three-year sentence from one judge drew a twenty-year term and a $65,000 fine from
another. These discrepancies could not be attributed to differences in the cases being
decided, since each judge was deciding on the same set of assumed facts.
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 28-29 (1980). For a report
on the conference of federal trial judges, see A. PARTRIDGE & W. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND
CIRCUIT SENTENCING STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974).
117 A 1972 survey of federal judges conducted by the American Criminal Law Review yielded,
inter alia, the following results:
Of the 149 judges surveyed, 83 had not visited YCA facilities.
- Of the 66 who visited, 44% believed adequate treatment was being provided to YCA
inmates, while 42% did not. Of those who did not visit, 31% believed the treatment to
be adequate while 34% did not.
- Of those who visited the facilities, 86% did not believe courts should be required to
approve the release of a YCA inmate. The figure was 89% for those who did not visit.
FEDERAL YOUTH CORRECTIONS ACT
then, there would be differences of opinion between the trial judge who
imposes a YCA sentence and a second trial judge who finds that the
defendant will derive no benefit from a YCA sentence for a subsequent
crime. "8 Furthermore, the first and second trial judges differ in their
approaches to sentencing. The first judge designs the YCA sentence to
fit the person, not the crime;" 19 the second judge, having rejected the
rehabilitative path for the offender imposes the conventional adult sen-
tence. Under such circumstances, the second judge cannot share the
first judge's views, and therefore should not be permitted to alter the
first sentence.
A fundamental difficulty arises if the second judge's determination
as to the original YCA sentence conflicts with what the first judge would
have chosen to do under the changed circumstances. The most equita-
ble solution would probably be to allow the second judge to sentence
solely for the second crime, and allow the first judge to reevaluate the
sentence for the first crime. In order to avoid encroaching upon the first
judge's sentencing discretion, the Robinson Court could have required the
second trial judge to remand the case to the first trial judge for such
purposes. By placing the decision back in the hands of the initial trial
judge, the Court could preserve the sentencing discretion deemed so es-
sential to the YCA rehabilitative scheme.'
20
The language of the YCA, however, does not support reevaluation
and modification of a YCA prison term by either a second judge or the
Note, The Federal Youth Corrections Act: Past Concern in Need of Legirlative Reappraisal, II AM.
CRIm. L. REv. 229, 270-71 (1972).
118 A second trial judge might even disagree with the first trial judge's decision to give a
youth offender an adult sentence. In a case involving the opposite situation from that in
Robinson, the first circuit held that a trial court sentencing a young defendant already serving
an adult sentence was required to make its own "no benefit" finding before declining to
sentence under the Act. United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1980). In Fortes, the
second trial judge suggested that the only reason for not sentencing under the YCA was that
the sentence would frustrate the judgment of the previous court. Id. at 126. The first circuit
disagreed: "[T]he second sentence does not alter or eliminate the basic fact of the earlier
imposed initial sentence. It thus cannot be deemed to 'frustrate' the first court's judgment."
Id.
The Fortes court observed that a youth sentence "superimposed on an existing adult sen-
tence" might affect "the place and terms of confinement." Id. (emphasis added). It did not
suggest that a consecutive YCA sentence would have the modifying effect. Hence, the Fortes
rationale suggests that a subsequent court should make its own determination regarding the
applicability of a YCA sentence, but that it should not "frustrate" the first court's determina-
tion. In Robinson, unlike Fortes, the Supreme Court authorized a second trial court to redeter-
mine the first sentence itself.
119 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. at 434.
120 See King v. Kenney, 671 F.2d 1053 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendant, whose YCA parole was
revoked by Parole Commission upon his later conviction in state court, was entitled to go
back to original federal trial court to determine whether he was entitled to a YCA term
instead of an adult term) (decided pursuant to Robinson).
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original judge. The statutory provisions allow a subsequent judge either
to impose a concurrent adult sentence, 2 1 thereby terminating the origi-
nal YCA sentence, or to continue the original YCA sentence. 122 Either
of these statutory routes would have enabled the Robinson Court to avoid
encroaching upon the initial judge's sentencing discretion.
D. THE COURT'S AMBIVALENCE CONCERNING REHABILITATION
Although the Court has continuously emphasized the Act's rehabil-
itative goals, 123 in Robinson both the majority and the dissent doubted
whether inmates such as Robinson could benefit under the Act. 124 Yet,
the seventh circuit had raised a logical point: Robinson might derive
benefit from the remainder of his YCA sentence regardless of the consec-
utive adult sentence; the second trial judge could have imposed the con-
secutive adult sentence because Robinson either would benefit from the
unexpired YCA sentence, thus not requiring further treatment, or would
not benefit, thus demonstrating the futility of further treatment.125 Jus-
tice Marshall dismissed this argument as "sheer speculation."' 126 Under
a legislative scheme which presumes rehabilitation is possible for youth
offenders unless otherwise explicitly shown, Justice Marshall's summary
dismissal of any rehabilitative possibilities for Robinson demonstrates
the Court's disillusionment about the rehabilitative ideal of the YCA.
The Court's doubts about Robinson's rehabilitative potential prob-
ably reflect the doubts of many commentators about the efficacy of re-
habilitation in general. 127 In particular, many commentators are
121 See supra text accompanying notes 71-97.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 89-98.
123 See, e.g., Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542 (1978); Dorszynski v. United States, 418
U.S. 424 (1974).
124 Justice Marshall noted: "Apparently, the Court of Appeals believed that a rehabilita-
tive purpose may have existed here. However, given the facts of this case, any such belief is
sheer speculation." 102 S. Ct. at 244 n.11. Justice Stevens said: "I do not purport to know
whether YCA treatment is effective for youthful offenders in general, or would serve any
useful purpose for this particular offender." Id. at 252.
125 642 F.2d at 1082.
126 102 S. Ct. at 244 n.22.
127 Some commentators argue that since research demonstrates that rehabilitation has not
succeeded, see D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. WILKES, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORREC-
TIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975), the penal
system should abandon rehabilitation and adopt the notion of punishment as its central goal.
See R. McGEE, PRISONS AND POLITICS 131-33 (1981); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE:
THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 4-6 (1980). Others argue that rehabilitation fails because it is
practiced under the oppressive conditions of imprisonment. D. SULLIVAN, THE MASK OF
LOVE: CORRECTIONS IN AMERICA: TOWARD A MUTUAL AID ALTERNATIVE 61 (1980)
("What most people failed to grasp all along amid the debates over the demise of rehabilita-
tion is that is makes no difference whether you beat people into submission with a baseball
bat (outright punishment) or with a pillow (treatment): the effect is the same."); Y. BAKAL &
H. POLSKY, REFORMING CORRECTIONS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS: ALTERNATIVES AND
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skeptical about the effectiveness of rehabilitating young offenders. 128 In-
deed, lower courts have questioned the rehabilitative power of the
YCA.' 29 Yet, rehabilitation retains its defenders, who see the concept as
STRATEGIES (1979) (study of the deinstitutionalization of the Massachusetts juvenile correc-
tions system). For a discussion of the growing disillusionment over rehabilitation, see F. AL-
LEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
128 "The massive loss of confidence in the rehabilitation ideal, which gained its momentum
from a series of research findings demonstrating the inefficiency of treatment interventions,
has led to a rekindling of older sentencing philosophies such as retribution . . . . and inca-
pacitation." Rutherford, Emerging Themes of Federal Youth Crime Policy, 4 JUST. Sys. J. 88, 91
(1978). The IJA-ABA Standards governing sentences for youth offenders asserts public pro-
tection, not treatment, as the primary goal of juvenile justice. INST. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN.-
AM. BAR ASS'N JOINT COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING
TO CORRECTIONS ADMINISTRATION (1980).
Public protection from juvenile crime should be explicitly acknowledged as a legitimate
and central purpose of the juvenile judicial process. Controls imposed on the juvenile
should be explicitly acknowledged as a legitimate and central purpose of the juvenile
judicial process. Controls imposed on the juvenile should be explicit and not disguised or
confused with offers of help.
Id. at 47 (commentary to Standard 1.2). "Increasingly, during the last ten years, the treat-
ment model has been discredited." Id. at 88 (commentary to Standard 4.10).
Some commentators argue that juveniles above age 16 should not be treated as children
at all:
There is no compelling or convincing evidence that persons aged sixteen to eighteen
differ significantly from persons aged eighteen and over in their capacity to understand
the outcomes and consequences of their acts . . . . Youth should be given all the aid
that helping and educational services can offer. But serious crime should be treated
seriously regardless of the offender's age.
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
ON SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENPERS 25 (1978) (dissent by Marvin E.
Wolfgang).
At a time when the overall trend in the criminal juitice system is toward firmer punish-
ment policies, the Task Force calls for (or perpetuates) . . . a pattern of leniency toward
youth crime . . . . [Tihe Task Force construes the word "youth" very broadly. Were
the term applied solely to those whom I have heretofore regarded as juveniles-young-
sters who have not reached puberty or those who have attained it within three or four
years-I would have no problem with such a lenient approach. But the Task Force has
applied this term to individuals as old as twenty. . . . [T]he Task Force itself recognizes
that this age group is responsible for much of the crime that continues to scourge our
society.
Id. at 21 (dissent by Richard H. Kuh).
Yet another commentator suggests that rehabilitable youth offenders outgrow delin-
quency even without treatment, hence there is no need for a separate juvenile justice system.
Simpson, Rehabilitation as theJusticwation ofa Separate Juvenile justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REV.
984 (1976) (Law should provide "restrained intervention" for youth offenders).
129 "[Federal] judges prefer to sentence the majority of young offenders under the sentenc-
ing alternatives for adults." G. MUELLER, SENTENCING: PROCESS AND PURPOSE 15 (1977).
One reason might be that judges perceive the YCA as providing no more rehabilitation than
an ordinary adult sentence. The ninth circuit found the two types ofsentences to be fungible:
As the government conceded at oral argument, the original rehabilitative purposes of the
YCA have generally been abandoned. See Partridge, Chaset and Eldridge, The Sentencing
Options of Federal District Judges, 84 F.R.D. 175, 200 (1980). The Bureau of Prisons cur-
rently assigns young offenders to exactly the same institutions as the older ones, under a
policy of assigning each offender to an institution of the lowest security level consistent
with adequate supervision. Id. at 201-02. Those sentenced under the YCA receive the
same educational and vocational training opportunities as do adults. Id. at 201-02.
16751982]
SUPREME CO UR T RE VIE W
viable under modified expectations. t30
As Justice Stevens pointed out, though, it is for Congress to weigh
the arguments for and against rehabilitation under the YCA; only Con-
gress may enlarge upon the statute in the manner that the Robinson ma-
jority took it upon itself to do. 13' Even if the result in Robinson were
desirable, it should have come from Congress, not from the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
In Ralston v. Robinson, the Supreme Court held that a YCA inmate
sentenced to a consecutive adult term need not receive further YCA
treatment under the unexpired YCA term. In so holding, however, the
Court ignored alternatives provided under the statute. Instead, it en-
gaged in what the dissent properly termed "a judicial rewriting of what
'has been accurately described as the most comprehensive federal statute
concerned with sentencing.' "132 The Court should have held that
Robinson must either continue to receive YCA treatment under his
unexpired YCA sentence, or be sentenced to a concurrent adult term.
In addition to reaching the incorrect holding on statutory grounds, the
Robinson Court created a problem of double jeopardy and enroached
upon a judge's discretion to impose a YCA sentence.
The Court may have decided to enlarge upon the meaning of the
Youth Corrections Act in response to growing doubts about the efficacy
of rehabilitation. The flaws of the holding in Robinson demonstrate that
United States v. Amidon, 627 F.2d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 1980) (footnote omitted).
Yet, the eighth circuit was not willing to recognize such an abandonment of the rehabili-
tative ideal under the YCA. In United States v. Hudson, 667 F.2d 767 (8th Cir. 1982), the
court held that although the defendant was not receiving the mandated YCA treatment, the
Bureau of Prisons should have the opportunity to rectify the situation by proceeding with a
plan to be implemented by April 1, 1982: "Briefly, under this plan YCA offenders will be:
(1) totally segregated from non-YCA offenders, (2) screened, evaluated and then classified for
individual treatment programs, and (3) provided educational and vocational training. We
commend the Bureau of Prisons for its efforts and strongly encourage it to implement dili-
gently the policies of the YCA." Id. at 771.
130 [To assert that rehabilitation doesn't work for offenders as a whole is not the same as
saying that it cannot work for some. . . . [Also,] rehabilitation can be defined more
broadly to include vocational training programs, education programs, prison jobs that
translate into free world job opportunities. . . . And if it is, then. . . rehabilitation has
and can "work."
R. CARLSON, THE DILEMMAS OF CORRECTIONS 35 (1976). Norval Morris contends that
rehabilitation should be the goal of the prisons. He argues that such rehabilitation, however,
must not be coerced but voluntary, or "facilitative." N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRIS-
ONMEN'r (1974).
I31 102 S. Ct. at 251-52.
132 Id. at 248 (quoting Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 432 (1974)).
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the Court should have deferred to Congress to provide the solution in
this case.
LINDA MAR
